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The case of Aleksandr Nikitin is not just the story of an innocent man imprisoned for the 
last nine months on charges of high treason.(2) It has come to symbolize the struggle 
between two incompatible systems in the Russian Federation. Nikitin, a retired navy 
officer and environmental activist, represents progressive forces that seek to cure 
Russian society from the problems which it inherited from the Soviet Union and to 
establish a healthy democracy. The Federal Security Service (FSB) represents the 
forces still saturated with the Soviet mentality, suspicious of initiatives originating from 
individual civilians, conservative and authoritarian. With politicians refusing to stop the 
FSB's advance, the future of Russia's democratization process and its shaky rule of law 
is in the hands of the judiciary--a daunting task and major test of independence for an 
institution that only too recently practiced "telephone justice" (i.e., sentences handed 
down by telephonic instructions from a "superior authority").
The image of Muscovites hauling down the statue of Feliks Dzerzhinsky in Lubyanka 
Square in August of 1991 symbolized the change that had taken place in the position of 
the KGB in the late 1980s. Much like the entire Soviet leadership, the previously all-
powerful KGB had been thoroughly discredited by the streams of compromising facts 
which Gorbachev's glasnost' had unleashed. In the euphoria over the prospect of a 
democratic Russia immediately after the break-up of the Soviet Union, the security 
service was sized down, stripped of many of its powers, renamed, and supposedly 
placed under democratic supervision.
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The break with the past had occurred, but was it sufficiently radical? As studies of 
revolutions have consistently shown, a complete break with the past is impossible. One 
can replace some key politicians and bureaucrats but not the whole bureaucracy, as 
that would leave the country ungovernable. Russia and the KGB are no exceptions to 
that rule. It is probably an illusion to believe that the KGB legacy can be eradicated 
easily; old dogs don't usually learn new tricks. Such a state of affairs may not be 
particularly desirable but it does not have to pose an insurmountable obstacle to the 
democratization of the FSB's activities. Openness in its work and tight democratic 
control are of vital importance here and it is exactly in this regard that Boris Yel'tsin and 
his colleagues have failed hopelessly.
When the hard reality of transition dawned on the initially euphoric Russian leadership, 
the direction of policies started to change. As politicians became preoccupied 
increasingly with fighting for their political survival, attention to democratic principles and 
human rights faded. As the leadership fought off attacks from political opponents, it 
increased the powers of the former KGB. For example, the power to carry out criminal 
prosecution--a right which led to frequent arbitrary prosecutions in Soviet times--was 
reinstated. At the same time, governmental openness rapidly decreased and more and 
more information came to be qualified as state secrets.
Whether it is a sign of poor political judgment or an indication of his meager 
commitment to democracy and human rights, Boris Yel'tsin ignored an obvious but vital 
rule with respect to the successor of the KGB: to prevent a relapse of old habits (which 
are known to die hard) it was necessary to remove from control the main initiators and 
perpetrators of Soviet suppression of dissent. The current head of the FSB in Moscow is 
Anatoli Trofimov, who was in charge of the prosecutions of Sergei Kovalev, Yuri Orlov, 
Viktor Orekhov and other well-known dissidents. In St. Petersburg the security service is 
headed by General Viktor Cherkesov, another known dissident hunter.
It can hardly be considered surprising that an organization in which the work culture has 
changed little and which is led by those who previously were actively involved in 
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"defending communism" will not change voluntarily in a democratic direction. It is rather 
more likely that it will seek re-establishment of its former unlimited powers. This is 
exactly what we have observed over the last few years. Unfortunately, politicians have 
granted the security organs additional powers as time passed. In 1996 the case against 
Aleksandr Nikitin, if successful could constitute a major step towards the KGB's full 
recovery.
The Case
Aleksandr Konstantinovich Nikitin was arrested on 6 February 1996 by officers of the 
FSB and accused of high treason in the form of espionage (Article 64, Criminal Code 
1960). Nikitin's work for the Norwegian environmental organization "Bellona Foundation" 
lies at the base of the charges. As an employee of this organization, he was involved in 
drafting a report on the ecological dangers of nuclear contamination caused by the 
Russian Northern Fleet, and specifically nuclear submarines. Until 1992, Nikitin worked 
in the Russian Northern Fleet and later at the Ministry of Defense in Moscow. At that 
time he had security clearance; when he left the ministry he took on the obligation not to 
divulge secrets that had become known to him during his service.
After nine months of criminal investigation the FSB finally issued the formal indictment. 
Apart from the charges of high treason in the form of espionage, Nikitin is also accused 
of having misused a military identity card and contacts in the military to gain access to 
secret documents. At present, Nikitin's lawyers are plowing their way through 5,000 
pages of files on the case in Kafkaesque circumstances. They are not allowed to take 
the files home. Files may be copied but only by hand. Those files that are labeled 
"SECRET" may be copied but the notes must remain at the FSB headquarters in St. 
Petersburg. The lawyers can only work with the files during office hours.
This article will not take up the question of Nikitin's guilt or innocence; rather it attempts 
to place the Nikitin case in the context of political developments in Russia. Other 
publications have argued Nikitin's innocence quite convincingly.(3) The methods of 
criminal investigation used by the FSB in this case are of major importance because 
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they show clearly that the FSB has acted out of political considerations, that the FSB 
does not consider itself bound by the rule of law. How else can any of the following 
violations of criminal procedure and other irregularities be explained?
Directly after Nikitin's arrest, the FSB deprived him of the right to a lawyer of his own 
choice. Only the Constitutional Court could force the FSB to undo this gross violation of 
human rights. Other procedural violations relate to the appointment and work of two 
expert committees which were charged by the FSB with assessing whether the Bellona 
report contains state secrets. The FSB has refused to appoint to these committees 
experts proposed by the defense and the FSB-picked expert committees have refused 
to look into claims by Nikitin and Bellona that all information in the Bellona report can be 
found in openly available sources, claiming that they are "not competent" to look at that 
issue. The FSB and the expert committees have ignored the constitutional right to live in 
a decent environment and to have reliable information about the condition of the 
environment.(4) Instead they have used two unpublished decrees of the Ministry of 
Defense which predate the Law on State Secrets as a basis for the assessment. To 
make matters worse, copies of the decrees of the Ministry of Defense still have not 
been given to the defense.(5)
Other factors indicate that the FSB is more interested in getting Nikitin convicted than in 
establishing the truth in this case. The FSB has used the media to depict Nikitin as a 
traitor who sold his country's interests for a pittance; the term "presumption of 
innocence" apparently has no place in the FSB dictionary. In its attempts to disinform 
Russian society, the FSB has even gone as far as to claim that the Bellona report has 
no relation whatsoever to environmental issues. Such a statement is as ridiculous and 
dangerous as saying that the Chernobyl accident had no environmental consequences.
Legal and Political Consequences 
In states that adhere to the rule of law, as Russia does according to Article 1 of its 
Constitution, all government action (including that of the security services) is bound 
strictly by law. The utter contempt shown by the FSB for the principle of rule of law 
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would have led in most democratic societies to the immediate dismissal of the case for 
reasons of procedural violations. In Russia, however, this may not happen. Russian 
politicians currently are unwilling to intervene and it is questionable whether the now 
formally independent judiciary will be able to resist pressures from the FSB. In fact, it 
could well be that the FSB has deliberately violated the principle of rule of law in an 
attempt to force judicial endorsement of its behavior. The conviction of Aleksandr Nikitin 
in court would sanction the arbitrary methods used by the FSB in the case and thus 
would recognize in effect that the FSB is not bound by the rule of law--an extremely 
dangerous precedent! Considering the past behavior of the leading figures of the FSB in 
Moscow, St. Petersburg, and other cities, such a verdict could have significant 
consequences.
One can safely assert that the next victims of the arbitrary practices of the FSB would 
not be average Russian males but the more vocal members of Russian society--people 
like Nikitin who take the initiative to address problems that may be embarrassing for the 
government, the military or the FSB, but still have to be solved, people who work in the 
sphere of the civil society. It is exactly this sphere of activities that was repressed so 
fiercely by the KGB in Soviet times and it will be the FSB's playing field for further 
repression. The importance of a civil society for the development of democracy is well-
known. Western governments and foundations, such as the Soros Foundation and the 
European Union's TACIS program, have been channeling a lot of money to non-
governmental organizations and structures in Russia. These organizations provide 
governments with information, make them aware of certain pressing problems, and 
closely monitor the activities of the government. Such activities are of vital importance 
for a functioning democracy.
One effect that the prosecution already has had on the civil society is called preventive 
self-censorship. Non-governmental organizations will be careful from now on not to 
concern themselves with the field of environmental problems caused by nuclear 
installations. The FSB has thus effectively reclaimed this field as its exclusive domain. 
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The paradox is that the Bellona report demonstrates just how harmful it is to leave such 
an important and dangerous issue to the military and the security service.
For a closer look at the potential consequences it is useful to review a similar case 
which occurred in 1992. Vil Mirzayanov, a chemistry professor, was arrested in October 
1992 for allegedly having leaked state secrets (Article 75 Criminal Code 1960).(6) 
Mirzayanov had written an article for a weekly newspaper in which he pointed out that 
Russia's huge chemical warfare pile was not being destroyed, despite Russia's 
commitment to do so. As in the Nikitin case, the accusation was based on a list of 
offenses against state secrets that was adopted in 1980 and had never been published. 
Another similarity is that the FSB refused to appoint specialists proposed by Mirzayanov 
to the expert committee which was to assess whether the article contained state 
secrets. Criminal proceedings against Mirzayanov were closed after political 
intervention by the Procurator General. The procurator ruled that information 
constituting a state secret had not been divulged, basing his decision mainly on the fact 
that the list of state secrets had never been published and thus could not be applied.
Despite the existence of such a precedent, one cannot expect that the case of Nikitin 
will end necessarily in a similar way. The decision to halt the Mirzayanov case was 
made by a political figure, not a judge. Political figures and interests change quickly and 
regularly. Indeed, the procurator who closed the Mirzayanov case has since been 
removed and a new person has taken his place. Generally speaking, the political 
climate has changed considerably since 1994 to the disadvantage of persons like 
Mirzayanov and Nikitin, creating an atmosphere favorable to another FSB attempt to 
reassert its powers.
In February 1996 Russia was already deep into the presidential campaign. Politicians 
were highly reluctant to undertake any actions that might compromise their positions 
after the unpredictable outcome of the elections. Even the otherwise articulate 
progressive media refused to do more than report dry facts on the case, in accordance 
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with a self-imposed ban on criticism of Boris Yel'tsin until his re-election. The hope that 
after the elections there would be more support for Nikitin proved to be idle.
On the other hand, the FSB grossly underestimated the changes that had already taken 
place in Russia. Its refusal to respect Nikitin's right to a lawyer of his own choice was 
appealed in the Constitutional Court, and on 27 March 1996 the court ruled that the 
FSB's refusal was unconstitutional. Suddenly the FSB was confronted with a 
professional, highly skilled defense team which was determined to defend Nikitin to the 
best of its abilities. It immediately became apparent how little basis existed for the 
charges against him.
It is now up to the judiciary to restate Russia's continued commitment to the rule of law. 
Considering the incomplete state of the criminal investigation, an independent judge will 
have no choice but to send the case back to the FSB for further investigation and to 
release Aleksandr Nikitin. It is, however, questionable how independent the judge(s) will 
be. In the court hearings concerning Nikitin's release on bail, the judges were clearly 
influenced by the FSB. We must hope the judiciary will not allow one of its judges to 
give in to the FSB pressure and disgrace the entire judicial system.
As with many happenings, there may be a good side. If Aleksandr Nikitin is acquitted by 
a court, this will indicate that the judiciary in Russia is maturing slowly into an 
independent power and that it felt comfortable enough to withstand the undoubtedly 
enormous pressure from the FSB to convict him. But that is not all. In case of a defeat, 
the FSB will suffer tremendous loss of face. For almost a year it has been spreading 
false information depicting Nikitin as a traitor who sold his country's interests for a 
pittance. Suddenly it would become clear that all that propaganda was a lie. We may 
hope that politicians and the media will highlight the blunders of the FSB. Maybe such a 
defeat would allow environmentalists and human rights activists to work for a few years 
without being hindered by the FSB. And by the time the FSB recovers, Russian civil 
society and democracy may have become strong enough to place the FSB under real 
democratic control.
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Notes:
1 The opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily correspond to those of 
Amnesty International. 
2 See, for example, Boris Altshuler, "Human Rights and State Secrecy," Perspective, 
vol. VII, no. 1, September-October 1996. 
3 All the information in the parts of the Bellona report relate to the charges against 
Nikitin can be found in other publicly available sources. See, among others, Amnesty 
International, "Federal Security Service (FSB) versus Prisoner of Conscience Aleksandr 
Nikitin: Return to Soviet Practices" (EUR 46/42/96, September 1996) (http://
www.amnesty.org). See Bellona's web site for a wide selection of documents on the 
Nikitin case: http://www.grida.no/ngo/bellona/ 
4 Russian law (Article 42 and the Law on State Secrets of 1993, respectively) contains 
the right to reliable information about the condition of the environment and prohibits the 
classification of environmental information as "state secret"; international law allows 
restrictions on freedom of expression only in extreme circumstances of a direct military 
or political threat to the entire nation.
5 Such actions are in violation of the constitutional provision that normative legal acts 
which restrict the rights and freedoms of citizens cannot be applied if they have not 
been published officially (Article 15). 
6 See also Vil S. Mirzayanov, "Chemical Weapons: An Exposé," Perspective, vol. IV, no. 
4, April-May 1994.
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